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Introduction 
Fighting words doctrine is controversial1 both with respect to its 
breadth2 and even to whether it is still a live doctrine.3 While the United 
States Supreme Court has occasionally cited the doctrine with approval 
in dictum,4 the Court has not relied on it in any case since Chaplinsky 
 
1. Robert M. O’Neil, Hate Speech, Fighting Words, and Beyond—Why American 
Law Is Unique, 76 Alb. L. Rev. 467, 472 (2013) (“Seventy years later, 
Chaplinsky remains a persistent source of constitutional confusion.”); Burton 
Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is 
a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 Marq. L. 
Rev. 441, 443–44 (2004) (describing the Court’s fighting words exception as 
“a category so ill-conceived that not once in the ensuing sixty-two years has 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on it”). 
2. G. Edward White, Falsity and the First Amendment, 72 SMU L. Rev. 513, 
521 (2019) (discussing “a tendency to narrow the scope of certain unprotected 
speech categories, such as . . . ‘fighting’ words”); Kevin P. Donoughe, Can 
Dead Soldiers Revive a “Dead” Doctrine? An Argument for the Revitalization 
of “Fighting Words” to Protect Grieving Families Post-Snyder v. Phelps, 63 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 743, 750 (2015) (“The Court began to steadily narrow 
the grounds on which ‘fighting words’ are held to apply . . . .”); Norman T. 
Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An 
Analysis of “Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the 
“Visible Boundaries of the First Amendment,” 39 Akron L. Rev. 483, 502 
(2006) (alteration in original) (“[S]ince Chaplinsky, the Court has actually 
expanded the scope of protection afforded to such speech, by ‘narrow[ing]’ the 
definitional line between fighting words that are excluded from the First 
Amendment and speech that remains included.”). 
3. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest 
Proposal?, 1990 Duke L.J. 484, 510 (1990) (suggesting that “Chaplinsky’s 
fighting words doctrine is no longer good law”); Note, The Demise of the 
Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for Its Interment, 106 
Harv. L. Rev. 1129 (1993) (“The jurisprudential history of the Chaplinsky 
doctrine has led some commentators to conclude that the Court has sub rosa 
overruled the entire fighting words doctrine . . . .”); Melody L. Hurdle, R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words Doctrine, 
47 Vand. L. Rev. 1143, 1156 (1994) (“[C]ourts and scholars repeatedly have 
disagreed about the application and viability of the concept [of fighting 
words].”); cf. Clay Calvert, Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-
Mails: Can a Disparaged Doctrine Be Resuscitated to Punish Cyber-Bullies?, 
21 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 1, 1–2 (2010) (footnote omit–
ted) (discussing “the much-maligned class of speech known as fighting words”). 
4. See O’Neil, supra note 1, at 472 (“[T]he case has been persistently cited with 
sufficient deference to imply that uttering ‘fighting words’ remains a recognized 
exception to First Amendment freedoms.”); Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of 
an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated Fighting Words, 72 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 385, 402 (2005) (“[T]he Court has repeatedly affirmed the 
doctrine’s continued vitality.”) 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?  
251 
v. New Hampshire in which the doctrine was announced.5 That said, the 
Court has never overruled Chaplinsky,6 and state courts continue to rely 
on the doctrine to uphold convictions.7 
Part II of this article discusses the ever-changing fighting words 
jurisprudence. Regrettably, the Court has offered conflicting accounts 
of what the doctrine involves and which speech limitations are constit–
utionally permissible.8 Part III discusses how some of the states have 
applied the fighting words doctrine. As might be expected, the United 
States Supreme Court’s mixed messaging has resulted in different state 
approaches to which expressions constitute fighting words and are thus 
subject to regulation.9 The article concludes that the Court’s confused 
and confusing analysis has not only resulted in certain expressions being 
(federally) constitutionally protected in some states but not in others, 
but has also constrained the ability of states to effectuate public policy. 
The Court’s commitment to free expression and to applying the law 
with integrity is undermined by its failure to clearly articulate a 
consistent approach to fighting words, and articulating such an app–
roach will help prevent harms that will otherwise continue unabated 
and will help counteract the perception that the Court’s commitment 
to free expression wavers depending upon the issues or individuals 
before it. 
 
5. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); see also 
Friedlieb, supra note 4, at 389 (noting that “the Supreme Court has never 
affirmed another fighting words conviction”). 
6. Thomas M. Place, Offensive Speech and the Pennsylvania Disorderly Conduct 
Statute, 12 Temp. Pol. & C.R.L. Rev. 47, 59 (2002); Katherine Grace 
Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the 
Pretext of Probable Cause, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 607, 630 (2017) (quoting 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) (“[T]he category of fighting words, defined in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire as ‘those which by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,’ has not been 
overruled . . . .”); Beth C. Boswell-Odum, The Fighting Words Doctrine and 
Racial Speech on Campus, 33 S. Tex. L. Rev. 261, 283 (1992) (“Chaplinsky 
has not been overruled . . . .”). 
7. See Evans v. State, 525 S.E.2d 780, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Read, 
680 A.2d 944, 953 (Vt. 1996); State v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473, 478–79 
(Conn. 1996); State v. Nelson, No. 13-CR-13-107, 2014 WL 7237043, at *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2014); Watkins v. State, 377 S.W.3d 286, 291 
(Ark. Ct. App. 2010). 
8. Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (reversing the plaintiff’s 
conviction because of the overly broad nature of the statute providing the 
basis of his conviction), with Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 318 n.1, 321 
(1951) (upholding the plaintiff’s conviction despite the broad language of the 
statute providing the basis of his conviction.).  
9. See Evans, 525 S.E.2d at 782; Read, 680 A.2d at 953; Szymkiewicz, 678 
A.2d at 478–79; Nelson, 2014 WL 7237043 at *4; Watkins, 377 S.W.3d at 
291. 
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I. The Ever-Changing Fighting Words Doctrine 
In the very case in which the fighting words doctrine was 
recognized, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,10 the Court offered mixed 
signals about when the doctrine could be invoked to uphold convictions. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has continued to offer contradictory 
indications about what kinds of fighting words limitations pass 
constitutional muster, ultimately leaving the impression that members 
of the Court either cannot agree about or do not understand what the 
fighting words doctrine is or when it can be applied. 
A. The Doctrine Announced 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court upheld a conviction for 
disturbing the peace.11 Chaplinsky had been distributing literature 
denouncing religion as a racket.12 Citizens complained to the City 
Marshal, Bowering,13 who replied that Chaplinsky was merely exercising 
his rights14 but who also warned Chaplinsky that the crowd was growing 
restless.15 Some hours later, the crowd “got out of hand and treated 
Chaplinsky with some violence.”16 A traffic officer escorted Chaplinsky 
to the station, likely to protect him.17 The United States Supreme Court 
expressly noted that the traffic officer “did not inform [Chaplinsky] that 
 
10. 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
11. See id. at 574 (“[T]he challenged statute, on its face and as applied, does 
not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
12. See id. at 570. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. (“Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged . . . .”). 
15. Id. 
16. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941). 
17. See id. at 758 (noting that the officer’s action was “apparently more for 
[Chaplinsky’s] protection than for arrest, since his arrest was definitely fixed 
only after he uttered the words charged”); Hurdle, supra note 3, at 1147 (“A 
police officer led Chaplinsky toward the city police station to protect him 
from nearby listeners who reacted violently to the derogatory comments.”); 
Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 
1527, 1534 (1993) (“[A] police officer escorted Chaplinsky toward the police 
station, apparently for his own protection.”). 
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he was under arrest or that he was going to be arrested,”18 at least 
implying that there was no basis for an arrest at that point.19 
Along the way, Chaplinsky and the officer ran into Bowering to 
whom Chaplinsky allegedly said, “You are a God damned racketeer” 
and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are 
Fascists or agents of Fascists.”20 Chaplinsky claimed that his comments 
were made after Bowering had called Chaplinsky a damned bastard.21 
Chaplinsky was charged with and convicted of making comments that 
would likely bring about an immediate breach of the peace.22 
When reviewing his conviction, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
understood that Chaplinsky was probably angry because he had been 
assaulted by the crowd and because he believed that the police had 
failed to protect him.23 But, the New Hampshire court reasoned, even 
if it were true that Chaplinsky had been provoked, that would not 
excuse his having called Bowering names.24 
The purpose of the statute at issue was “to preserve the public 
peace, no words being ‘forbidden except such as have a direct tendency 
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the 
remark is addressed.’”25 When explaining the standard to determine 
whether particular expressions would count as fighting words, the New 
Hampshire Court explained that the “test is what men of common 
 
18. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570. See also Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical 
Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 Ind. L.J. 
917, 920 (2009) (“When a disturbance occurred, the traffic officer on duty at 
the intersection hustled the speaker off to the police station, but without ever 
telling him formally that he was under arrest.”). 
19. But see David Goldberger, Sources of Judicial Reluctance to Use Psychic 
Harm as a Basis for Suppressing Racist, Sexist and Ethnically Offensive 
Speech, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 1165, 1174 (1991) (“The defendant . . . had just 
been arrested for publicly making derogatory religious statements.”). 
20. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
21. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759 (“The defendant admittedly called the Marshal 
a damned racketeer and Fascist, in exchange, as the defendant says, for the 
Marshal’s calling him a damned bastard.”). 
22. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569; see also Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758 (“Its 
plain tendency was to further breach of order, and it was itself a breach of 
the peace.”). 
23. See Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758; see also Caine, supra note 1, at 448 (suggesting 
that Chaplinsky was “[p]rovoked and angered by Marshal Bowering’s words, 
by the refusal of the police to protect his constitutional right to speak, as well 
as by the blows he had received from the crowd”). 
24. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759 (“Chaplinsky could no more defend unlawful speech 
on the ground of provocation than could one of the street-crowd have defended 
a charge of calling Chaplinsky names on the ground that the name-caller had 
been incensed by Chaplinsky’s teachings.”). 
25. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758). 
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intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight.”26 There was no indication that the individual at 
whom the epithets were directed (Bowering) was even tempted to 
engage in fisticuffs,27 but that did not matter—the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court reasoned that while there may be a time “when the 
words ‘damned Fascist’ will cease to be generally regarded as ‘fighting 
words’ when applied face-to-face to an average American, this is not 
the time.”28 The United States Supreme Court cited the New Hampshire 
court’s interpretation with approval.29 Because the statute at issue was 
limited to punishing individuals who had uttered fighting words,30 the 
Court held that the application of the statute to Chaplinsky’s com–
ments did not violate First Amendment guarantees.31 
That Bowering was unlikely to engage in fisticuffs after being called 
a fascist32 did not immunize Chaplinsky’s conviction under the statute, 
given that the average person (at the time33) might well have responded 
with violence when called such a name.34 This position helps cast light 
on the proper interpretation of Cantwell v. Connecticut,35 decided two 
years earlier, which involved someone expressing offensive opinions 
about religious groups.36 
In a neighborhood known to have a high concentration of 
Catholics,37 Jesse Cantwell stopped two individuals and asked them if 
 
26. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762. 
27. Caine, supra note 1, at 454 (“Nor was there any evidence that City Marshal 
Bowering was provoked to violence or that any mythical reasonable man 
would have been so provoked.”). 
28. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762. 
29. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. 
30. See Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 758 (“[N]o words were forbidden except such as 
have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, 
individually, the remark is addressed.”). 
31. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (“Nor can we say that the application of the 
statute to the facts disclosed by the record substantially or unreasonably 
impinges upon the privilege of free speech.”). 
32. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
33. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762. 
34. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (“Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that 
the appellations ‘damned racketeer’ and ‘damned Fascist’ are epithets likely 
to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of 
the peace.”). 
35. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
36. Id. at 302–03. 
37. Id. at 301 (“Cassius Street is in a thickly populated neighborhood, where 
about ninety per cent of the residents are Roman Catholics.”). 
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he could play a phonograph record for them.38 When they consented, 
he played a record highly critical of the Roman Catholic Church.39 The 
two men, who were Catholic,40 were “incensed” and “were tempted to 
strike Cantwell unless he went away.”41 Cantwell went away when told 
to do so.42 
The Court noted that there “was no evidence that [Cantwell] was 
personally offensive or entered into any argument with those he 
interviewed.”43 Further, there was no showing either that Cantwell’s 
“deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive” or that “he 
intended to insult or affront the hearers by playing the record.”44 Yet, 
the Court was not thereby implying that the record contents were 
innocuous—on the contrary, the record “naturally would offend not 
only persons of that persuasion [(Roman Catholics)], but all others who 
respect the honestly held religious faith of their fellows.”45 
If indeed the comments were that offensive, their utterance might 
well have resulted in violence. Further, the Court was quite clear that 
“[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with 
traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safe–
ty, peace, or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish 
is obvious.”46 Nonetheless, the Court reversed Cantwell’s conviction.47 
Commentators offer different theories as to why that conviction did 
not pass constitutional muster.48 One interpretation of Cantwell is that 
the relevant standard regarding a clear and present danger of violence 
had not been met because the violence had not been imminent but 
would only have occurred if Cantwell had refused to leave.49 But if that 
 
38. See id. at 302–03. 
39. Id. at 303 (explaining that Cantwell “played the record ‘Enemies,’ which 
attacked the religion and church of the two men, who were Catholics.”). 
40. Id. (noting that the “two men . . . were Catholics”). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (“On being told to be on his way he left their presence.”). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 308–09. 
45. Id. at 309. 
46. Id. at 308. 
47. Id. at 311. 
48. See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text. 
49. Andrew M. Zeitlin, Comment, A Test of Faith: Accommodating Religious 
Employees’ “Work-Related Misconduct” in the United States and Canada, 
15 Compar. Lab. L.J. 250, 254 (1994) (“Had there been evidence that the 
Cantwells’ solicitation presented a clear and present danger of riot or dis–
order, the Court likely would have upheld Connecticut’s power to punish the 
offense.”); Sheila M. Cahill, Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, 
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is why Cantwell’s speech was protected, then the relevant constitutional 
protection does not seem very robust. Suppose that the two passersby 
had not told Cantwell to leave but instead had simply struck him.50 In 
that event, the very speech on the record would seem to have been the 
cause of imminent violence. If that speech would then have been 
unprotected, then the constitutional protection afforded to Cantwell’s 
speech would not only have depended upon its content but also on who 
happened to hear it.51 
Constitutional protections do not seem very strong if they depend 
upon the luck of the draw, e.g., who happens to be in the audience 
when particular comments are made.52 That said, Cantwell is not a 
particularly good case to explore the connection between constitutional 
protections and chance. Cantwell had gone into a neighborhood known 
for having a high concentration of Catholics,53 so it was not merely a 
matter of chance that the persons listening to the record were 
Catholic.54 Arguably, playing a record making highly offensive 
 
Equal Access, and the First Amendment, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 117, 120 n.20 
(1975) (“[A]ctual violence apparently was never imminent.”). 
50. Cf. Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory 
and Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against 
Controversial Speech, 21 Comm. L. & Pol’y 175, 182 (2016) (“Cantwell 
leaves the door open for future convictions of speakers who incite a hostile 
audience to a violent reaction.”). 
51. But see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted 
Zones, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1292 (2005) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–09) (suggesting that the Cantwell “Court 
set aside the conviction because the speech constituted breach of the peace 
only because of ‘the effect of [the speaker’s] communication upon his hear–
ers’”). 
52. Cf. Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 Yale L.J.F. 
82, 90 (2015) (“Highly varied and uneven protections might be interesting 
as a matter of social policy experimentation, but they are no way to deal 
with the protection of constitutional rights.”) (footnote omitted); Dan T. 
Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1533, 
1555 (2017) (“The problem with this doctrinal approach is hard to miss: in 
effect, it permits the state to punish a speaker because of the unlawfully 
belligerent—indeed, the riotously belligerent—actions of unsympathetic 
listeners.”). 
53. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301 (1939); see supra text 
accompanying note 40. 
54. See Marie A. Failinger, Five Modern Notions in Search of an Author: The 
Ideology of the Intimate Society in Constitutional Speech Law, 30 U. Tol. 
L. Rev. 251, 274 (1999) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301–03) (“Jesse 
Cantwell and his Jehovah’s Witness comrades were ‘invading’ some of the 
most sensitive public space moderns can imagine, going from house to house 
in a ‘thickly populated,’ heavily Catholic neighborhood in New Haven, 
offering books or playing records which attacked Catholics scurrilously as 
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comments about Catholicism would be even more likely to pose a clear 
and present danger of engendering violence if those hearing the 
comments were themselves (likely) Catholic55 than would making such 
comments in front of an audience composed of individuals likely of a 
different faith.56 In any event, it is somewhat difficult to believe that 
Cantwell’s speech did not create a clear and present danger of violence57 
but that Chaplinsky’s did, given that there was no suggestion that 
Bowering was even tempted to strike Chaplinsky.58 
 
‘enemies,’ thus highly offending several hearers.”); see also David S. Allen, 
Spatial Frameworks and the Management of Dissent: From Parks to Free 
Speech Zones, 16 Comm. L. & Pol’y 383, 404 (2011) (“Cantwell and his 
sons focused on a neighborhood where about 90% of the residents were 
Roman Catholics . . . .”). 
55. See William C. Nevin, “Fighting Slurs”: Contemporary Fighting Words and 
the Question of Criminally Punishable Racial Epithets, 14 First Amend. 
L. Rev. 127, 133 (2015) (discussing “Cantwell’s preaching . . . [and] its 
natural tendency to offend Catholics”); Stewart Jay, The Creation of the 
First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth Century 
to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 773, 883 (2008) 
(“But hadn’t Cantwell created an ‘immediate threat’ to public order, saved 
only by his swift retreat?”); R. George Wright, The Heckler’s Veto Today, 
68 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 159, 162 (2017) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 
309) (“Cantwell’s two initially consensual listeners to his anti-religious and 
anti-Catholic speech ‘were in fact highly offended.’ In this instance, offense 
at least momentarily threatened to transition into physical violence against 
the speaker.”). 
56. But see Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309 (“[I]t then singles out the Roman Catholic 
Church for strictures couched in terms which naturally would offend not 
only persons of that persuasion, but all others who respect the honestly held 
religious faith of their fellows.”). 
57. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 Yale L.J. 978, 1011 (2011) 
(“[T]he Court held that Cantwell could not be convicted unless a clear and 
present danger existed of violence or other social harm and that the fact that 
Cantwell’s speech offended others was not a constitutionally permissible 
ground for punishment.”); Jay, supra note 55, at 889 (discussing the “tight 
limits on what speech would be found to present a clear and present danger 
of inciting violence or other criminal conduct”). 
58. Arnold H. Loewy, Distinguishing Speech from Conduct, 45 Mercer L. Rev. 
621, 628 (1994) (“There is no reason to think that Marshal Bowering was 
about to assault Chaplinsky.”); see also Jonathan A. Weiss, A Road Not 
Taken, 26 Seton Hall Legis. J. 415, 449 (2002) (“[T]he police officer 
should not be considered a danger to be provoked into violence by the man’s 
speech.”). Some commentators do not seem to appreciate this point. See, 
e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the 
Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 103, 160 
(1992) (“If Jesse Cantwell had, instead, insulted his auditors personally in a 
fashion likely to produce immediate violence, as did Walter Chaplinsky, the 
Constitution’s free expression guarantee (at least circa 1940) would pose no 
problem to legal sanction.”). 
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The Chaplinsky Court discussed a few kinds of speech that do not 
trigger First Amendment protections, including “the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”59 According to the 
New Hampshire law that Chaplinsky allegedly violated, fighting words 
were those that “have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the 
person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.”60 Yet if 
Bowering was the individual to whom the words were addressed and 
there was no indication that Bowering was even tempted to assault 
Chaplinsky, then one would have thought that the fighting words 
doctrine would not have been triggered. 
A closer examination of the doctrine articulated by the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court and endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court reveals that the doctrine at issue was not focused on the 
addressee’s actual or probable reactions.61 Instead, the test as to wheth–
er words had the prohibited tendency involved “what men of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight.”62 Fighting words included “‘classical fighting 
words’, words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause 
violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and 
threats.”63 
Interpreted in light of Chaplinsky, Cantwell was not emphasizing 
the fact that Cantwell had not in fact incited someone to strike him. 
Instead, the Court in Cantwell was emphasizing that the statute under 
which Cantwell was prosecuted was not narrowly tailored to prohibit 
only fighting words.64 The Cantwell Court explained: 
Although the contents of the record not unnaturally aroused 
animosity, we think that, in the absence of a statute narrowly 
 
59. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941). 
60. Id. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 38 A. 731, 732 (N.H. 1895)). 
61. See State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 (“The test is what men of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight. We have never applied the statute otherwise. The English 
language has a number of words and expressions which by general consent 
are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile.”); Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 573. 
62. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573. A separate issue is whether the standard of what 
would cause the common addressee to fight takes into account gender-related 
differences. See, e.g., Bunkosal Chhun, Note, Catcalls: Protected Speech or 
Fighting Words?, 33 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 273, 274 (2011) (“[M]ost women 
do not respond violently to verbal abuse, leaving verbal conduct, like catcalls, 
excluded by the doctrine.”). 
63. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 762). 
64.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1939). 
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drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a clear 
and present danger to a substantial interest of the State, the 
petitioner’s communication, considered in the light of the consti–
tutional guarantees, raised no such clear and present menace to 
public peace and order as to render him liable to conviction of the 
common law offense in question.65 
Thus, even though Cantwell’s speech was offensive and might 
indeed have aroused animosity and caused violence, that was not 
enough for him to be convicted of causing a breach of the peace, given 
that the statute was not limited to proscribing those kinds of utterances 
having a clear and present danger of provoking violence. While the state 
is of course permitted to act to prevent riots and public disturbances,66 
the means used to do so must be appropriately tailored so as not to 
preclude protected speech.67 
Chaplinsky itself provides additional support for the interpretation 
that an important element of these cases involves the statutes under 
which the individuals were prosecuted, rather than merely the partic–
ular contents of the respective communications.68 Chaplinsky had been 
addressing the crowd and had been warned that the crowd was getting 
restless,69 i.e., that his continuing to speak might in fact result in unrest. 
Nonetheless, he continued to speak and was eventually attacked by the 
crowd.70 He was later brought towards the station by a police officer,71 
although the Court expressly noted that Chaplinsky was not told that 
he was under arrest.72 Yet, Chaplinsky had addressed the crowd in a 
way that he had already been warned might well result in violence, and 
the Court nonetheless suggested that the crowd’s reaction was not what 
provided the basis for the arrest.73 If that is so, then one’s having made 
 
65. Id. (emphasis added). 
66. Id. at 308. 
67. Id. at 311. 
68. See Nevin, supra note 55, at 133 (discussing the role played by the breadth 
of the respective statutes in Cantwell and Chaplinsky); see also Frolik v. State, 
392 So. 2d 846, 847 (Ala. 1981) (discussing Chaplinsky and Cantwell and then 
noting that “the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively 
construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of app–
lication to protected expression” (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
522 (1972))). 
69. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942). 
70. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941). 
71. See id. 
72. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 570. 
73. See William Shepard McAninch, A Catalyst for the Evolution of Consti–
tutional Law: Jehovah’s Witnesses in the Supreme Court, 55 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 997, 1033 (1987) (“It was not until he was being led to the police 
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comments that would probably or even actually result in violence might 
not suffice to establish that one had uttered fighting words.74 
Suppose that Cantwell had been struck by those listening to the 
record. Even so, Cantwell’s conviction would likely have been reversed, 
given the content of his speech and the breadth of the statute under 
which he was prosecuted.75 But if that is so, then the Cantwell Court’s 
having noted that no violence had in fact taken place76 was not meant 
to suggest implicitly that if there had been violence the breach of peace 
conviction would have been upheld.77 On the contrary, the conviction 
still would not have been upheld, because there still would have been 
“no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no 
intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse”78 by Cantwell. Further, 
there still would have been a “situation analogous to a conviction under 
a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and 
indefinite characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial 
branches too wide a discretion in its application.”79 
If the Cantwell Court was not suggesting that the lack of violence 
was what provided the basis for striking down Cantwell’s conviction, 
then some explanation must be offered as to why the Court bothered 
to mention that there had been no violence. The Court was likely 
illustrating its point that “in practically all [of the breach of peace 
 
station (whether for protection or arrest is unclear) that Chaplinsky spoke 
the offending words to the city marshal.”). 
74. In other contexts, the Court has rejected that the prevention of violence will 
justify any speech prohibition. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor 
Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 296 (1941) (“Nor may a state enjoin peaceful picketing 
merely because it may provoke violence in others.” (citing Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697, 721–22 (1931) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940))). 
75. See Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (noting that “[c]onvictions 
for ‘breach of the peace’ where the offense was imprecisely defined were . . . 
reversed”). 
76. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939). 
77. But see Massey, supra note 58, at 157 (“The Supreme Court reversed 
Cantwell’s conviction of inciting a breach of the peace because, in part, there 
was not a sufficient causal connection between his speech and the threatened 
harm.”). 
78. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310; see also Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-
Value Speech, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2166, 2201 (2015) (explaining that the 
Cantwell Court’s “analysis would have been different had the defendant 
engaged with his unwilling interlocutors in a less polite fashion”). 
79. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308; see also Nevin, supra note 55, at 133 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310) (“Cantwell’s preaching, despite 
its natural tendency to offend Catholics and all those who adhere to organized 
religion, failed to meet this standard of ‘profane, indecent, or abusive 
remarks . . . .’”). 
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cases], the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach 
of the peace consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed 
to the person of the hearer.”80 According to this interpretation, the 
Court was not providing the criterion for a disturbing-the-peace convic–
tion. Instead, the Court was merely noting that these cases rarely, if 
ever, involve violence if no personal insults are made.  
Terminiello v. Chicago81 involved a disorderly conduct conviction82 
arising out of a speech in Chicago causing a violent reaction in a 
crowd.83 When striking down the conviction, the Court focused on the 
construction of the statute rather than on whether Terminiello’s words 
would likely result in a breach of the peace.84 Indeed, one might infer 
from the Court’s description of Terminiello’s speech that the breach of 
the peace was readily foreseeable—“[p]etitioner in his speech con–
demned the conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously, if not 
viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities 
he denounced as inimical to the nation’s welfare.”85 It would be 
unsurprising for such language to result in unrest, although there was 
some question whether his speech in fact caused the disturbance. 86 
The statute under which Terminiello had been convicted was not 
merely designed to prevent riots or disorder. Instead, “the statutory 
 
80. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309. 
81. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
82. Id. at 2. 
83. See id. at 13 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“But the local court that tried 
Terminiello was . . . dealing with a riot and with a speech that provoked a 
hostile mob and incited a friendly one, and threatened violence between the 
two.”); Eva DuBuisson, Teaching from the Closet: Freedom of Expression 
and Out-Speech by Public School Teachers, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 301, 327 (2006) 
(“Terminiello gave a speech to a large audience in a public meeting hall; 
outside, an angry crowd of protesters condemned his speech and created a 
violent disturbance.”); Comment, The Constitutionality of A Requirement to 
Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 270, 274 (1969) (“In 
Terminiello, the appellant delivered a speech severely attacking various 
political and racial groups, thereby creating great unrest in the crowd 
assembled outside the auditorium in which he was speaking.”). 
84. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5 (“[T]he gloss which Illinois placed on the 
ordinance gives it a meaning and application which are conclusive on us. 
We need not consider whether as construed it is defective in its entirety. As 
construed and applied it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional. 
The verdict was a general one; and we do not know on this record but what 
it may rest on the invalid clauses.”); see also Lynch v. State, 236 A.2d 45, 
53 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1967) (emphasizing the role of statutory construc–
tion in Terminiello). 
85. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3 (emphasis added). 
86. See id. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that those outside the 
hall where the address was given did not hear Terminiello’s words). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?  
262 
words ‘breach of the peace’ were defined . . . to include speech which 
‘stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of 
unrest, or creates a disturbance . . . .”87 But speech might invite dispute 
without resulting in violence or endangering the public. The Court 
reasoned that “a function of free speech under our system of government 
is to invite dispute.”88 Because “[t]he ordinance . . . permitted convic–
tion of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public 
dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest,”89 the “conviction 
[could] . . . not stand.”90 The Court expressly declined to address 
whether the speech at issue constituted fighting words,91 instead basing 
its reversal of the conviction on the breadth of the statute.92 
One court concluded that Terminiello undercut the inclusion of the 
“inflicts injury” prong93 of the characterization of fighting words as 
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or incite an 
 
87. Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 5. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 3 (“The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the 
content of petitioner’s speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, 
which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. . . . We 
do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is 
dispositive of the case.” (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942) and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1939))). 
92. But see id. at 7 (Vinson, C.J. dissenting) (“[T]he Illinois courts construed 
the ordinance as punishing only the use of ‘fighting words.’ Their opinions 
plainly show that they affirmed because they thought that the petitioner’s 
speech had been found by the jury to come within that category.”). 
93. State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Neb. 2010) (“In fact, it was only 7 
years after Chaplinsky that the Court began to retreat from the ‘inflict injury’ 
part of the definition. In Terminiello v. Chicago, the Court stated that a 
conviction could not rest on the grounds that the speech merely ‘stirred 
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of 
unrest.’ To fall within the First Amendment exception for fighting words, 
speech must be ‘shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a 
serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or unrest.’” (quoting Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5)). For a different 
interpretation, see City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 811 
(N.D. 1991), where the Supreme Court of North Dakota explained:  
Whatever the Chaplinsky Court meant by the phrase “words which 
by their very utterance inflict injury,” Terminiello and Gooding 
stand for the proposition that the fact that words are vulgar or 
offensive is not sufficient to remove them from the protection of the 
first amendment and into the arena in which the state can make 
conduct criminal. 
 City of Bismarck, 469 N.W.2d at 811. 
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immediate breach of the peace.”94 But there are a number of ways to 
interpret Terminiello that have nothing to do with the “inflicts injury” 
prong. For example, Terminiello had been addressing remarks to one 
audience about another group of people.95 Insofar as the “profane, 
indecent, or abusive remarks [must be] directed to the person of the 
hearer,”96 his address might have been thought not to count as fighting 
words because of the audience at whom it was addressed—that audience 
would neither have been incited to commit violence nor would have 
been likely to have felt injured by Terminiello’s words. Arguably, the 
Court did not see fit to discuss whether anyone in the audience would 
have felt injured because the Court did not believe injury a likely result 
in light of the audience’s composition, just as the Court likely did not 
believe that members of that audience would react violently. If one of 
the reasons that Terminiello’s speech did not constitute fighting words 
was that it was directed at an audience who might be sympathetic to 
his position,97 then the Terminiello Court would not have been excising 
the “inflicts injury” component of fighting words, but instead would 
have been focusing on the audience element of the fighting words 
doctrine. 
After Terminiello, one might have inferred that convictions for 
disorderly conduct or breach of the peace would not be upheld if based 
on overly broad statutes. Feiner v. New York,98 a case decided two years 
after Terminiello, suggests that the Court is not always willing to 
vacate convictions under overbroad statutes. 
Irving Feiner was convicted of disorderly conduct.99 He had been 
addressing a crowd, which had become restless.100 Some in the crowd 
supported his position while others did not, and the police were 
allegedly fearful that there might be a fight.101 Feiner was twice asked 
 
94. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (emphasis added). 
95. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3 (explaining that Terminiello was addressing an 
audience inside an auditorium about people who were protesting outside of 
the auditorium). 
96. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939) (emphasis added). 
97. Those who were viciously attacked in the speech might not have heard his 
words. See Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 8 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that 
“those outside the hall . . . did not hear the speech”). 
98. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). 
99. Id. at 316. 
100. Id. at 317. 
101. Id. (“Because of the feeling that existed in the crowd both for and against 
the speaker, the officers finally ‘stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a 
fight.’”). 
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to stop talking, but he refused.102 He was then arrested for violating the 
following statute: 
Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or 
whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any 
of the following acts shall be deemed to have committed the 
offense of disorderly conduct: 
1. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting 
language, conduct or behavior; 
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, 
obstruct, or be offensive to others; 
3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move 
on when ordered by the police.103 
The Court upheld the conviction.104 
Feiner is hard to square with the previous cases in part because of 
the statute’s breadth and in part because of the Court’s reasoning.105 
The statute prohibited speech that involved fighting words—abusive or 
insulting language—but also prohibited the kind of protected speech 
whose prohibition was in violation of constitutional guarantees. For 
example, criminalizing annoying106 or offensive107 language includes too 
much. A statute’s criminalizing protected speech might result in a jury’s 
finding an individual guilty of having committed a crime when the 
speech for which she was convicted was not the kind of speech that is 
 
102. Id. at 318. 
103. Id. at 318 n.1 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 722 (current version at N.Y. 
Penal Law § 240.20 (McKinney 2020))). 
104. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 321 (“The findings of the state courts as to the existing 
situation and the imminence of greater disorder coupled with petitioner’s 
deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us that we should not 
reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.”). 
105. James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of 
Judicial Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 471, 476 (1996) 
(noting “the lack of a precise constitutional rule announced by the [Feiner] 
Court”). 
106. Cf. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987) (“[W]e have repeatedly 
invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest 
individuals for words . . . that annoy or offend them.”). 
107. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1939) (“The hearers were in 
fact highly offended.”); see also William Drabble, Righteous Torts: Pleasant 
Glade Assembly of God v. Schubert and the Free Exercise Defense in Texas, 
62 Baylor L. Rev. 267, 270 (2010) (noting that Cantwell’s commun–
ications were offensive). 
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permissibly criminalized.108 One would have inferred after Terminiello 
that the overbreadth109 of the statute at issue in Feiner would have 
resulted in the convictions being vacated.110 
An additional point is that the crowd listening to Feiner may not 
in fact have been riled up—it seems equally plausible that the one 
individual who was upset could have been handled easily by the 
police.111 While Feiner had uttered insults, there was no evidence that 
those insults were directed at anyone present.112 Finally, if Feiner is 
justified because of a reasonable fear of a riot,113 then Terminiello should 
 
108. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1948) (“We need not consider whether 
as construed it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied it at 
least contains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one; 
and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid 
clauses.”). 
109. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (“There is an additional 
reason why this conviction cannot be sustained. The statute at issue in this 
case, as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is 
unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope.”). 
110. Cf. Aviva O. Wertheimer, Note, The First Amendment Distinction Between 
Conduct and Content: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Fighting 
Words Jurisprudence, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 793, 804 (1994) (“Despite its 
recent holding in Terminiello, the Court upheld the conviction [in Feiner].”); 
Macklin W. Thornton, Laying Siege to the Ivory Tower: Resource Allocation 
in Response to the Heckler’s Veto on University Campuses, 55 San Diego 
L. Rev. 673, 697 n.125 (2018) (noting “the change from Terminiello to 
Feiner”). 
111. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[O]ne 
person threatened to assault petitioner but the officers did nothing to dis–
courage this when even a word might have sufficed.”). But see Note, 
Blasphemy, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 694, 729 (1970) (“Feiner was convicted of 
disorderly conduct only after disorder by his audience seemed imminent as 
a result of his speech . . . .”). 
112. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that a few mayors 
and the President were insulted). In addition, Feiner insulted members of 
the American Legion. See id. It is not clear whether anyone from the 
American Legion was present, and in any event these comments would seem 
no more objectionable than those that Cantwell had directed against 
Catholicism to two individuals who were in fact Catholic. See Cantwell, 310 
U.S. at 303; see also Wertheimer, supra note 110, at 804 (“[T]he defendant, 
Feiner, made derogatory remarks about President Truman, local politicians 
and the American Legion.”). 
113. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (citing Feiner, 340 
U.S. at 317, 321) (suggesting that Feiner was inciting a riot); Brian J. Levy, 
Note, Who Wants to Know—and Why?: The Supreme Court’s Secret 
Purposivist Test for Exemptions from Association Membership Disclosure 
Laws, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 473, 503 (2012) (“The Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction. Emphasizing the danger of violence, the Court concluded that 
the arrest was constitutional because the police had the power to prevent a 
riot.”). 
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certainly have been decided differently, because there was an actual, 
easily foreseeable disturbance in the latter case.114 
B. Limiting Fighting Words to Exclude the Injury Prong? 
In a few fighting words cases, the Court has only considered 
whether the words at issue would result in violence rather than look in 
addition at whether the words would inflict injury. This has led some 
courts and commentators to conclude that the fighting words exception 
no longer includes the injury prong.115 
Street v. New York116 is sometimes cited as a case limiting the 
construction of fighting words doctrine.117 Sidney Street was convicted 
of destroying or casting contempt upon a United States flag by word or 
deed.118 On the day that Street heard that James Meredith had been 
 
114. See DuBuisson, supra note 83, at 327 (“Terminiello gave a speech to a large 
audience in a public meeting hall; outside, an angry crowd of protesters 
condemned his speech and created a violent disturbance.”). 
115. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting 
that fighting words doctrine includes an “inflicts injury” prong); State v. 
Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 806 (Neb. 2010) (“[T]he State cannot criminalize 
speech under the fighting words exception solely because it inflicts 
emotional injury . . . .”); see also Ronald Turner, Hate Speech and the First 
Amendment: The Supreme Court’s R.A.V. Decision, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 
197, 208 (1993) (“[C]ommentators have concluded that the inflict[s] injury 
prong of Chaplinsky is no longer good law.”); Ashley Barton, Oh Snap!: 
Whether Snapchat Images Qualify As “Fighting Words” Under Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire and How to Address Americans’ Evolving Means of 
Communication, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1287, 1305 (2017) (“The Court 
perhaps let the inflict[s]-injury prong fall to the wayside.”); Gregory Preves, 
The Death Knell for Hate-Crime Laws? The Supreme Court Protects 
Unpopular Speech in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 24 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 309, 
315 (1993) (“[T]he personal injury prong of Chaplinsky, which never enjoyed 
strong support by the Court, is now essentially dead.”); Clay Calvert, 
Cohen v. California Turns 40: F--- the Midlife Crisis, Commc’ns Law., 
March 2011, at 5 (“In brief, fighting words today must be conveyed in 
direct, one-on-one fashion and be likely to provoke an immediate, violent 
response in the context in which they are uttered.”); Brady Coleman, 
Shame, Rage and Freedom of Speech: Should the United States Adopt 
European “Mobbing” Laws?, 35 Ga. J. Int’l & Compar. L. 53, 82 (2006) 
(second alteration in original) (“[M]ost observers believe the first prong of 
the Chaplinsky test—excluding from First Amendment protection language 
which by its ‘very utterance inflict[s] injury’—has not survived the test of 
time.”). 
116. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
117. Donoughe, supra note 2, at 750 (“The Court began to steadily narrow the 
grounds on which ‘fighting words’ are held to apply, beginning in 1969 with 
Street v. New York.”). 
118. Street, 394 U.S. at 578. 
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shot,119 Street went outside with a United States flag and burned it. 
When asked whether he had burned the flag, he said, “Yes; that is my 
flag; I burned it. If they let that happen to Meredith we don’t need an 
American flag.”120 
Street was convicted under a statute which criminalized both the 
burning of the flag and using words to cast contempt upon a United 
States flag.121 He argued that the statute was unconstitutional both 
because it prohibited his saying certain words122 and because it prohib–
ited his engaging in certain expressive conduct.123 The Court saw no 
need to address the latter claim,124 because it held that the statute’s 
criminalizing the use of certain words about the American flag was 
unconstitutional.125 Because Street’s conviction might well have been 
based at least in part upon that unconstitutional provision,126 the 
conviction could not stand.127 
In reversing the conviction based on an unconstitutional speech 
limitation, the Court addressed whether the prohibition targeted words 
that fell into one of the recognized exceptions, e.g., fighting words. The 
Court reasoned, “Nor could such a conviction be justified on . . . the 
possible tendency of appellant’s words to provoke violent retaliation,”128 
although the Court conceded that it “it is conceivable that some 
listeners might have been moved to retaliate upon hearing appellant’s 
 
119. Id. (“Appellant testified that during the afternoon of June 6, 1966, he was 
listening to the radio in his Brooklyn apartment. He heard a news report that 
civil rights leader James Meredith had been shot by a sniper in Mississippi.”). 
120. Id. at 579. 
121.  Id. at 577–78 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 1425, subd. 16 (1909)). 
122. Id. at 580. 
123. Id. at 580–81 (“[H]e asserts that New York may not constitutionally punish 
one who publicly destroys or damages an American flag as a means of protest, 
because such an act constitutes expression protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
124. Id. at 581. 
125. Id. (“[W]e hold that § 1425, subd. 16, par. d, was unconstitutionally 
applied in appellant’s case because it permitted him to be punished merely 
for speaking defiant or contemptuous words about the American flag.”). 
126. Id. at 590 (“In the face of an information explicitly setting forth appellant’s 
words as an element of his alleged crime, and of appellant’s subsequent 
conviction under a statute making it an offense to speak words of that sort, 
we find this record insufficient to eliminate the possibility either that appell–
ant’s words were the sole basis of his conviction or that appellant was 
convicted for both his words and his deed.”). 
127. Id. at 594 (“[W]e reverse the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.”). 
128. Id. at 592. 
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disrespectful words.”129 Nonetheless, the Court rejected that “appell–
ant’s remarks were so inherently inflammatory as to come within that 
small class of ‘fighting words’ which are ‘likely to provoke the average 
person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.’”130 Here, 
the Court implied that even if violence had resulted, that would not 
have sufficed to establish that Street’s communication fell into the 
fighting words exception, because the average person would not have 
reacted violently to his words.131 
The construction of the fighting words exception in Street does not 
include anything about the likelihood that the words would cause injury 
to the person at whom they were directed.132 Yet, the Court’s having 
failed to include the injury component of fighting words when providing 
an analysis in Street may not have been because it was trying to change 
the analysis sub rosa133 but, instead, because the Court did not believe 
that these words would be viewed as personally insulting and hence did 
not believe that the words would plausibly be thought to cause anyone 
injury. 
The Street Court stated that the words employed simply did not 
constitute fighting words.134 But the Court seemed to step back from 
that judgment, explaining that even if his speech qualified as fighting 
words,135 the statute under which he had been convicted was over–
broad.136 
The Street Court addressed a related issue, namely, whether 
Street’s language could be regulated based on its offensiveness. The 
Court explained, “It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942)); see also 
Beverly Weinberg, Treating the Symptom Instead of the Cause: Regulating 
Student Speech at the University of Connecticut, 23 Conn. L. Rev. 743, 778 
(1991) (“[I]n Street v. New York[,] . . . [t]he Court held that the words used by 
the defendant were not so inherently inflammatory as to fall within that small 
class of fighting words.”). 
131. Street, 394 U.S. at 592. 
132. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
133. See Note, supra note 3, at 1129 (“The jurisprudential history of the Chaplinsky 
doctrine has led some commentators to conclude that the Court has sub rosa 
overruled the entire fighting words doctrine, or at least the ‘inflict injury’ 
prong.”). 
134. See supra notes 125–127 and accompanying text; see also Hurdle, supra 
note 3, at 1150 (“Street’s statement did not constitute fighting words 
because it was not directed to incite a violent response by any individual.”). 
135. Street, 394 U.S. at 592. 
136. Id. (“[Section] 1425, subd. 16, par. d, is not narrowly drawn to punish only 
words of that character, and there is no indication that it was so interpreted 
by the state courts.”). 
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public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the 
ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.”137 Here, it was 
unclear whether the Court was treating offensiveness as if it might be 
part of the fighting words exception138 or, instead, was listing several 
possible bases upon which the words might be thought excepted from 
First Amendment guarantees and then was discussing why each would 
not work.139 
Sometimes, when the Court suggests that words do not lose 
constitutional protection merely because they are offensive, the Court 
seems to be distinguishing between an individual’s feeling hurt and her 
feeling offended.140 Insofar as they are different kinds of reactions, the 
Court’s suggesting that convictions cannot be based on having caused 
offense141 would not also entail that convictions cannot be based on 
having hurt someone. In addition, the Court has implicitly disting–
uished between the causes for one’s taking offense—one might be 
 
137. Id. 
138. But see Victoria L. Handler, Legislating Social Tolerance: Hate Crimes and 
the First Amendment, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 137, 148 (1992) 
(“In effect, the [Street] Court had refined the ‘fighting words’ doctrine in 
terms of the ‘inflicts injury’ prong to read that the mere effect of offending 
or shocking a speaker does not constitute preventable injury.”). 
139. The Street Court considered and rejected that the words could be criminalized 
because they constituted incitement, fighting words, shocking or offensive 
words, or words manifesting a lack of respect for the flag. See Street, 394 U.S. 
at 591–92. 
140. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J., concurring) 
(“The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or 
resentment does not render the expression unprotected.” (citing United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990))); Amnon Reichman, The 
Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional Protections, Emotional 
Harm and Comparative Law, 31 Fordham Int’l L.J. 76, 123 (2007) 
(separately listing hurt feelings and offended sensibilities in an analysis of 
the Israeli Court’s free-expression cases). Some comments might cause both 
hurt and offense. See Christopher J. Roederer, Free Speech on the Law 
School Campus: Is it the Hammer or the Wrecking Ball That Speaks?, 15 
U. St. Thomas L.J. 26, 27 (2018) (discussing individuals “who are offended 
and hurt by insensitive language”). 
141. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“If there is a bedrock 
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may 
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea 
itself offensive or disagreeable.” (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
414 (1989))). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?  
270 
offended by an idea142 or by a personal insult,143 and the First Amend–
ment distinguishes between the two kinds of offense.144 
Sometimes, members of the Court do not distinguish between hurt 
feelings and offended sensibilities for purposes of the fighting words 
doctrine.145 But when the Court is not distinguishing between these, the 
kind of offense that is included within fighting words is the kind due to 
personal insult rather than an unpopular idea.146 
Suppose that the feelings of offense are due to a personal insult 
rather than a disagreeable idea.147 Even so, merely because someone has 
been offended, however slightly, would not establish that the fighting 
words exception had been triggered.148 Presumably, when the Court 
talks about the kind of offense that might qualify an expression as 
falling with the fighting words category, the Court is including a degree 
component—only words causing extreme offense or injury would qual–
ify.149 
Two years after Street was issued, the Court decided another case 
in which the Court has been interpreted to be limiting the fighting 
words exception. Paul Robert Cohen was convicted of disturbing the 
 
142. See Peter E. Quint, The Comparative Law of Flag Desecration: The United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 15 Hastings Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 613, 614 (1992) (“In 1984 Gregory Lee Johnson, a political protester, 
publicly burned an American flag near the Republican National Convention 
to express his disapproval of the renomination of President Reagan.”). 
143. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940) (“Resort to epi–
thets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of 
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution . . . .”). 
144. Cf. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409 (“No reasonable onlooker would have regarded 
Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the 
Federal Government as a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange 
fisticuffs.”). 
145. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring). 
146. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309–10 (suggesting that insults and epithets are 
unprotected). 
147. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 746 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[S]upp–
ression of uncongenial ideas is the worst offense against the First 
Amendment.”). 
148. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring) (“The mere fact that 
expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render 
the expression unprotected.” (citing United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 
319 (1990))). 
149. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Court 
might be saying that the fighting words exception would only be triggered 
if the person felt so hurt that she would be tempted to lash out in some 
way). 
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peace150 when he wore a jacket “bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’” in 
a courthouse.151 The Court addressed whether wearing such a jacket 
could be construed as employing fighting words and thus fall outside of 
First Amendment protection.152 
The Cohen Court defined fighting words as “those personally 
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as 
a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent 
reaction.”153 In this case, “the four-letter word displayed by Cohen . . . 
was clearly not ‘directed to the person of the hearer.’”154 Thus, because 
“[n]o individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably have 
regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct personal insult,”155 
the fighting words exception had not been met. 
There are a variety of reasons that the words on Cohen’s jacket did 
not constitute fighting words. For example, the Court citing Cantwell 
emphasized that the fighting words have to be directed at the person 
who likely would have had the negative response. One commentator 
has taken this limitation to mean that for an expression to count as 
fighting words, the person in particular must be insulted rather than 
simply be a member of a targeted group.156 Even if insults can count as 
fighting words when targeting a group of which a hearer157 is a mem–
ber,158 Cohen’s expression was not an insult and was aimed at the public 
 
150. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) (“Appellant Paul Robert Cohen 
was convicted in the Los Angeles Municipal Court of violating that part of 
California Penal Code § 415 which prohibits ‘maliciously and willfully 
disturb(ing) the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person . . . by . . . 
offensive conduct . . . .’”). 
151. Id. at 16. 
152.  See id. at 19–20. 
153. Id. at 20. 
154. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)). 
155. Id. 
156. See Massey, supra note 58, at 160 (“It is the right to be free of personal 
abuse that is carved out by the exception to free speech created by Cantwell 
and Chaplinsky, not a right to be free of abuse that inheres in the status of 
the auditor as a member of a social group.”). 
157. Here, there were no sounds. Instead, people saw the jacket. Cohen, 403 U.S. 
at 16–17. The Cohen Court did not imply that seeing versus hearing the 
words was the relevant differentiating feature. While the Cohen Court did 
suggest that “[t]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid 
further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes,” 
id. at 21, offended hearers might adopt an analogous remedy and cover their 
ears. But see Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) 
(“[I]t is much easier for the clinic to pull its curtains than for a patient to 
stop up her ears . . . .”). 
158. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298–99 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“There held to be ‘insulting or “fighting” words’ were calling one a ‘God 
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at large rather than at a particular group. Ironically, when noting that 
no one was likely be personally insulted, the Court was also explaining 
why the “inflicts injury” prong would not have been met, i.e., why this 
particular expression did not constitute fighting words even if the 
“inflicts injury” prong is included with the exception.159 
Cohen underscores some of the lessons of Street. Cohen’s “con–
viction quite clearly rest[ed] upon the asserted offensiveness of the 
words Cohen used to convey his message to the public.”160 Indeed, the 
statute that he had allegedly violated precluded engaging in “offensive 
conduct.”161 However, he had not engaged in conduct but speech,162 
which would mean that if his conviction were to stand it would be for 
having expressed offensive speech.163 
Like the Street Court,164 the Cohen Court examined several excep–
tions under the First Amendment to see if the expression at issue was 
immune from First Amendment scrutiny, but found that the expression 
on Cohen’s jacket did not fall into any of those categories.165 For 
example, the Court noted that “[t]his [was] not . . . an obscenity 
case,”166 because “[w]hatever else may be necessary to give rise to the 
States’ broader power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression 
must be, in some significant way, erotic.”167 The Cohen Court described 
fighting words as “those personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common know–
ledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction,”168 but rejected that 
this exception was triggered because no one would likely have felt 
 
damned racketeer’ and a ‘damned Fascist.’ Equally inciting and more clearly 
‘fighting words,’ when thrown at Catholics and Jews who are rightfully on 
the streets of New York, are statements that ‘The Pope is the anti-Christ’ 
and the Jews are ‘Christ-killers.’ These terse epithets come down to our 
generation weighted with hatreds accumulated through centuries of blood–
shed.” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 572, 574 
(1942))). 
159. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20. 
160. Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted). 
161. Id. at 16–17. 
162. Id. at 18–19. 
163. Id. at 19 (“Appellant’s conviction, then, rests squarely upon his exercise of 
the ‘freedom of speech’ . . . .”). 
164. See supra notes 116–139 and accompanying text. 
165. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19–22.  
166. Id. at 20. 
167. Id. (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)). 
168. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
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personally insulted.169 Cohen’s jacket could not be interpreted as an 
attempt to incite. “Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of 
the State’s police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally 
provoking a given group to hostile reaction.”170 Basically, the Court 
considered a number of possible bases upon which to argue that the 
First Amendment was not implicated and rejected each of them. 
When excluding the “inflicts injury” prong, the Cohen Court char–
acterized fighting words as those “likely to provoke violent reaction,”171 
just as the Street Court had.172 The Cohen Court might have been 
attempting to narrow what qualified as fighting words or instead might 
have been focusing on violent reactions because it could not take 
seriously that the words on Cohen’s back would cause anyone injury.173 
If indeed the reason that the Court in Street and Cohen did not include 
the personal injury prong of the fighting words exception was that the 
Court did not believe that the prong was plausibly implicated in the 
cases, then the conclusion that the Court had implicitly modified the 
exception would be error.174 
If courts and commentators were correct that the Court had excised 
the “inflicts injury” prong, one would not expect the Court to include 
that prong in future cases when discussing the fighting words excep–
tion.175 Yet, in the year following Cohen, the Court again considered a 
fighting words case, although this one involved language directed at a 
particular individual during a contentious confrontation.176 Johnny 
Wilson was convicted “on two counts of using opprobrious words and 
abusive language.”177 Wilson had said to a police officer, “‘White son of 
a bitch, I’ll kill you’ and ‘You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.’”178 
 
169. See id. 
170. Id. (citing Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951)). 
171. Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 568). 
172. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
173. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 (“No individual actually or likely to be present could 
reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket as a direct 
personal insult.”). 
174. But see Mannheimer, supra note 17, at 1539–40 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 572) (“Cohen reflected a heavily contextual approach [because] it 
restricted the prong of the fighting words doctrine directed at those words 
that ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ in favor of the prong directed 
at words that ‘tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’”). 
175. See infra notes 176–211 and accompanying text (discussing Gooding and 
Lewis). 
176.  Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 519 n.1 (1972) (quoting Wilson v. State, 
156 S.E.2d 446, 449–50 (Ga. 1967)). 
177. Id. at 518. 
178. Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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In addition, he had said to another officer, “You son of a bitch, if you 
ever put your hands on me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.”179 
When deciding whether the conviction should be affirmed, the 
Court focused on the breadth of the statute, noting that “the statute 
must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only 
unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected 
expression.”180 The Court implied that Wilson’s language could itself 
have been prohibited under a narrowly drawn statute,181 but that the 
statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally broad.182 
However, the fighting words test cited in Gooding includes the “inflicts 
injury” prong,183 which one would not have expected if the Court had 
modified the applicable test. 
The reason that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in 
Gooding is important to note. When defining the words that might 
cause a breach of the peace, the Court made clear that the state is not 
permitted to refuse to consider factors that would decrease the 
likelihood that an actual breach will take place.184 This qualification is 
important and modifies the fighting words analysis offered in Chaplin–
sky—even if it were true that the average person would have thought 
“Fascist” a fighting word,185 use of that word on that occasion did not 
seem at all likely to have resulted in a violent response.186 
The Gooding Court gave examples of Georgia courts that had failed 
to take into account evidence that violence was not likely to result.187 
For example, one court suggested that words might be prohibited if 
they might cause a breach of the peace even if on a particular occasion 
 
179. Id.  
180. Id. at 522 (majority opinion). 
181. Id. at 520 (“It matters not that the words appellee used might have been 
constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.”). 
182. See id. at 527 (“This definition makes it a ‘breach of peace’ merely to speak 
words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly. . . . 
[The statute], as construed, does not define the standard of responsibility 
with requisite narrow specificity.” (first quoting Street v. New York, 394 
U.S. 576, 592 (1969); and then citing Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 
(1966) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965))). 
183. See id. at 522 (“Appellant does not challenge these principles but contends 
that the Georgia statute is narrowly drawn to apply only to a constitutionally 
unprotected class of words—‘fighting’ words—‘those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’” 
(citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). 
184. Id. at 520–22. 
185. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
187. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525–27. 
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the words were “addressed to one who, on account of circumstances or 
by virtue of the obligations of office, cannot actually then and there 
resent the same by a breach of the peace.”188 Thus, if a policeman 
because of good training or the responsibilities of office would not have 
responded with violence, the relevant standard would not have been 
met. 
A different Georgia court had suggested that breaching the peace 
involves “disturbing the public peace or tranquility enjoyed by the 
citizens of a community.”189 But, the Gooding Court noted, such a 
construction “makes it a ‘breach of peace’ merely to speak words 
offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly.”190 
Basically, because the Georgia courts had interpreted the fighting words 
exception to involve the kinds of words that might as a general matter 
bring about a violent reaction even if in the particular case at hand 
there was no likelihood that there would be a violent reaction, the 
Georgia statute was including too much speech and thus could not 
survive constitutional review.191 
The Gooding Court’s failure to analyze whether the “inflicts injury” 
prong had been met does not establish that the doctrine has been 
modified to exclude that prong.192 Whether or not that prong was 
included, the Gooding Court was suggesting that the statute prohibited 
too much speech because of the failure to take into account factors 
indicating that no violence would in fact occur even when the average 
person would say that the language used would likely result in vio–
 
188. Id. at 526 (citing Elmore v. State, 83 S.E. 799, 799 (Ga. Ct. App. 1914)). 
189. Id. at 527 (citing Samuels v. State, 118 S.E.2d 231, 232 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1961)). 
190. Id. (citing Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)). 
191. See id. at 528 (“Because earlier appellate decisions applied § 26–6303 to 
utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would 
make an immediate violent response, it is clear that the standard allowing 
juries to determine guilt ‘measured by common understanding and practice’ 
does not limit the application of § 26–6303 to ‘fighting’ words defined by 
Chaplinsky.”). 
192. State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Neb. 2010) (alteration in original) 
(footnotes omitted) (“Similarly, in Gooding v. Wilson, the Court held that 
a breach of the peace statute was overbroad because it was not limited to 
fighting words. The Court reasoned that because the statute could be applied 
‘to utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed would 
make an immediate violent response, it is clear that [the statute is not 
limited] to “fighting” words defined by Chaplinsky.’ In effect, the Gooding 
Court read the ‘inflict injury’ prong out of the definition. Lower courts have 
followed the Supreme Court’s lead. ‘It is now clear that words must do more 
than offend, cause indignation or anger the addressee to lose the protection 
of the First Amendment.’” (first quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
528 (1972); and then quoting Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237, 239 (8th 
Cir. 1976))). 
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lence.193 Because the statute was overbroad, the Court did not need to 
address, for example, whether the statute was too broad for yet another 
reason because it would provide the basis for a conviction even though 
the officer had not felt injured to the requisite extent.194 
The Gooding Court held that a regulation is overbroad if it permits 
speech to be regulated merely because in some circumstances such 
speech might result in violence, where there was no reason to believe 
that the speech would result in violence on that particular occasion.195 
But if there has to be reason to believe that violence will result on a 
particular occasion, then the Court was including two conditions within 
its fighting words analysis of imminent violence: (1) the speech has to 
be the kind of language that people of common intelligence would know 
would result in an immediate breach of the peace,196 and (2) the 
language had to be likely to cause a breach in the particular context in 
which it was communicated.197 
While the Court did not offer a separate analysis of the “inflicts 
injury” prong, the Court might have used an analogous two-part test 
when seeking to apply this prong: (1) the speech has to be the kind of 
language that people of common intelligence would know would likely 
result in an injury (of sufficient severity),198 and (2) the language had 
 
193. Some commentators fail to appreciate that the overbreadth of the statute 
meant that the Court did not have to decide whether the speech at issue 
qualified under the “inflicts injury” prong, just as the Court did not have 
to decide whether this speech qualified under the words that will cause an 
immediate violent response prong. See Friedlieb, supra note 4, at 390 (citing 
Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519, 528) (“[I]n Gooding v[.] Wilson, the Court struck 
down a Georgia law banning ‘opprobrious words or abusive language’ 
because it was applied in a case where no likelihood existed of an immediate 
violent response. Thus, the Court held that the law was unconstitutional 
because it merely banned speech that ‘inflicted injury’ without the accom–
panying threat of a breach of the peace.”). 
194. An officer hearing this might not have felt injured but threatened. See 
William Cohen, A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 
1595, 1605 (1987) (“Gooding . . . did not resolve the question of whether, 
in appropriate circumstances, threats or profanity aimed at police officers 
could still be punished under the Chaplinsky theory.”). 
195. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 527. Ironically, there was violence on that occasion, 
although that violence was not caused by the verbal exchange. See Wilson 
v. State, 156 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. 1967) (“The officers attempted to remove 
them from the door, and a scuffle ensued.”). 
196. See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 523 (quoting State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 762 
(N.H. 1941) (“The test is what men of common intelligence would under–
stand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”)). 
197. See id. at 525–27; see also Hurdle, supra note 3, at 1152–53 (“The Gooding 
Court also utilized the Cohen actual addressee standard to determine whether 
speech would incite violence.”). 
198. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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to be likely to cause injury to the person to whom it was actually 
addressed.199 
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,200 the Court again addressed 
whether the use of opprobrious language could be prohibited. There was 
conflicting testimony about what happened.201 The officer testified that 
Mallie Lewis had said, “[Y]ou god damn m. f. police.”202 Justice 
Blackmun in his dissent argued that “[t]he speech uttered by Mrs. Lewis 
to the arresting officer ‘plainly’ was profane, ‘plainly’ it was insulting, 
and ‘plainly’ it was fighting. It therefore is within the reach of the 
ordinance, as narrowed by Louisiana’s highest court.”203 However, the 
Lewis Court focused on the breadth of the relevant statute, which read: 
“It shall be unlawful and a breach of the peace for any person wantonly 
to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or 
with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual 
performance of his duty.”204 
The Louisiana Supreme Court construed the relevant statute as 
“narrowed to ‘fighting words’ uttered to specific persons at a specific 
time . . . .”205 But the United States Supreme Court reasoned that the 
statute “plainly has a broader sweep than the constitutional definition 
of ‘fighting words’ announced in Chaplinsky . . . and reaffirmed in 
Gooding . . . , namely, ‘those (words) which by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”206 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court had explained that “[p]ermitting the cursing 
or reviling of or using obscene or opprobrious words to a police officer 
while in the actual performance of his duty would be unreasonable and 
basically incompatible with the officer’s activities and the place where 
 
199. Cf. State v. DeLoreto, 827 A.2d 671, 684 (Conn. 2003) (“[N]or are true 
threats typical of contemporary manners such that we should expect police 
officers to have a ‘thick skin.’”). However, police officers are not expected 
to have a thick skin about some things, e.g., threats to physical safety. See 
id. (“A police officer is not trained to be fearless in the face of a credible 
threat that he will be the victim of a crime, and we can perceive of no reason 
that he should be . . . .”). 
200. 415 U.S. 130 (1974). 
201. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Appellant’s and the officer’s respective 
versions of the incident are conflicting . . . .”). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 141. 
204. Id. at 132 (majority opinion) (quoting New Orleans, La., M.C.S. § 49–7 
(1956)). 
205. Id. (citing City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1972), 
rev’d, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)). 
206. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) and 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972)). 
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such activities are performed.”207 But that would include words that, 
while making the officer uncomfortable, would not likely lead to 
violence and might well not be viewed as personal insults.208 In his 
concurrence in the result, Justice Powell noted that it was “unlikely . . . 
that the words said to have been used here would have precipitated a 
physical confrontation between the middle-aged woman who spoke 
them and the police officer in whose presence they were uttered.”209 
If the Lewis Court had needed to apply the “inflicts injury” prong, 
then the Court might have had to decide whether a “god damn m. f. 
police” 210 should be viewed as “a harmless letting off of steam”211 rather 
than as a personal insult. Or, the Court might have recognized the 
expression as an insult but might have thought the insult insufficiently 
extreme to qualify under the relevant standard. That might be because 
being called such a name was not considered sufficiently injurious to 
qualify.212 Or, the Court might have been qualifying the personal insult 
prong just as it had qualified the fighting words prong, reasoning that 
just as police (because of good training or good self-control) might not 
 
207. Id. (quoting Lewis, 269 So. 2d at 456). 
208. Id. at 133 (“At the least, the proscription of the use of ‘opprobrious lan–
guage,’ embraces words that do not ‘by their very utterance inflict injury 
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.’” (quoting Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972))). 
209. Id. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring). 
210. Id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
211. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
212. Courts sometimes must decide whether the use of epithets are sufficiently 
extreme or outrageous to qualify for purposes of an intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim. Compare Margita v. Diamond Mortg. Corp., 406 
N.W.2d 268, 271 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A] panel of this Court found that 
racial epithets in the course of throwing the plaintiff out of the defendant’s 
retail store could be considered extreme and outrageous conduct under the 
circumstances.” (citing Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 318 N.W.2d 558, 562 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1982))), with Graham ex rel. Graham v. Guilderland Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 681 N.Y.S.2d 831, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (Cardona, P.J., 
dissenting) (discussing “case law wherein the use of racial slurs and epithets 
has been held not to constitute the type of extreme and outrageous conduct 
necessary to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress” (citing Herlihy v. Metro. Museum of Art, 633 N.Y.S.2d 106 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996) and Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 548 N.Y.S.2d 
513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989))), Herlihy, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 113–14 (finding that 
falsely accusing someone of being a user of racial slurs “does not rise to the 
level of outrage required to recover under a cause of action that is limited to 
only the most egregious of acts”), and Leibowitz, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (finding 
that the use of religious and ethnic slurs “in this case did not rise to such an 
extreme or outrageous level as to meet the threshold requirements for” 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
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respond with fisticuffs to words that might provoke others,213 police 
might also be trained to become inured to such comments rather than 
find them deeply offensive and harmful.214 
The Court in City of Houston v. Hill addressed “whether a 
municipal ordinance that makes it unlawful to interrupt a police officer 
in the performance of his or her duties is unconstitutionally overbroad 
under the First Amendment.”215 Noting that “[t]he Houston ordinance 
is much more sweeping than the municipal ordinance struck down in 
Lewis,”216 the Court concluded that the ordinance was substantially 
overbroad and unconstitutional.217 The Court saw no need to ask the 
state courts to construe the statute, believing the ordinance “not 
susceptible to a limiting construction because . . . its language is plain 
and its meaning unambiguous.”218 
 
213. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 135 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[A] properly trained officer 
may reasonably be expected to ‘exercise a higher degree of restraint’ than 
the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to ‘fighting 
words.’” (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 901, 913 (1972) 
(Powell, J., concurring))). 
214. See Resek v. City of Huntington Beach, 41 F. App’x 57, 59 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(“Along with good judgment, intelligence, alertness, and courage, the job 
of police officers requires a thick skin. Theirs is not a job for people whose 
feelings are easily hurt.”); Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 947 (Pa. 
1999) (“We recognize that the police often place their lives in jeopardy to 
ensure the safety of the citizenry and thus perform a task that is valuable, 
necessary and, at times, heroic. Accordingly, the prospect of a citizen 
verbally abusing a police officer appears particularly objectionable. It does 
not follow, however, that Section 5503(a) may be used as a vehicle to 
protect the police from all verbal indignities, especially under the dubious 
hypothesis that officers are likely to break the law when affronted. The 
police must expect that, as part of their jobs, they will be exposed to daily 
contact with distraught individuals in emotionally charged situations.”); 
see also Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Masculinities Studies, 
Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 671, 735 
n.348 (2009) (quoting James J. Fyfe, Training to Reduce Police-Civilian 
Violence, in And Justice for All: Understanding and Controlling 
Police Abuse of Force 163, 164 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 
1995)) (discussing training designed to help police not personalize insults 
directed towards them). 
215. 482 U.S. 451, 453 (1987). 
216. Id. at 462. 
217. Id. at 467. 
218. Id. at 468. 
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Cantwell,219 Terminiello,220 Street,221 Cohen,222 Gooding,223 Lewis,224 
and Houston225 all involved statutes that were overbroad. For the first 
time in a fighting words case, the R.A.V. Court struck down a statute 
because it was too narrow.226 
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court examined the consti–
tutionality of the following statute: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited 
to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has 
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment 
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender 
commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a mis–
demeanor.227 
The Minnesota Supreme Court had construed the “modifying 
phrase ‘arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others’ [as] limit[ing] the 
reach of the ordinance to conduct that amounts to ‘fighting words,’ i.e., 
‘conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate 
violence.’”228 The R.A.V. Court noted that it was “bound by the 
construction given to it by the Minnesota court,”229 i.e., that the statute 
merely prohibits “conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite 
immediate violence.”230 
Yet, it might be noted that the Court’s options were not as limited 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction as the R.A.V. opinion 
implied. The Louisiana Supreme Court had interpreted the statute at 
 
219. See supra notes 35–80 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra notes 81–97 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 116–139 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 150–174 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra notes 176–197 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text. 
225. See supra notes 215–218 and accompanying text. 
226. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (“The First Amendment 
does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers 
who express views on disfavored subjects.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991))). 
227. Id. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1983)). 
228. Id. (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. 1991), 
rev’d sub nom. R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377). 
229. Id. at 381. 
230. Id. at 380 (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510). 
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issue in Lewis as confined to fighting words,231 and the Lewis Court had 
nonetheless held that the statute was overbroad.232 Nonetheless, the 
United States Supreme Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
conclusion that the statute only barred fighting words and came to the 
paradoxical conclusion that even if “all of the expression reached by the 
ordinance is proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, [the 
Court] nonetheless conclude[s] that the ordinance is facially unconsti–
tutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the 
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”233 
The R.A.V. Court explained that “the ordinance applies only to 
‘fighting words’ that insult, or provoke violence, ‘on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender,’”234 which meant that fighting words on 
other bases such as political affiliation, sexual orientation, or union 
membership were not in addition proscribed.235 Yet, it is at best 
misleading to suggest that these other expressions were “otherwise per–
mitted,”236 because there was another Minnesota statute prohibiting 
speech that constituted fighting words.237 Here, presumably, the com–
plaint was that this statute criminalized certain fighting words but not 
others which means that a particular statute would have to either ban 
all fighting words or none at all.238 
The R.A.V. Court offered an exception to this all-or-none rule: 
“[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the 
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no 
 
231. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (noting that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court “took the position that, as written, ‘[the statute] is narrowed 
to “fighting words” uttered to specific persons at a specific time’” (quoting 
City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 269 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1972))). 
232. Id. at 134 (“Since § 49-7, as construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is 
susceptible of application to protected speech, the section is constitutionally 
overbroad and therefore is facially invalid.”); see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 
412–13 (White, J., concurring) (citing Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132–33) (“We have 
stricken legislation when the construction supplied by the state court failed 
to cure the overbreadth problem.”). 
233. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (emphasis added). 
234. Id. at 391. 
235. See id. (“Those who wish to use ‘fighting words’ in connection with other 
ideas—to express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, 
union membership, or homosexuality—are not covered.”). 
236. Id. at 381. 
237. See Minn. Stat. § 609.72 (2019), invalidated by State v. Hensel, 901 
N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 2017). 
238. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Within a particular 
‘proscribable’ category of expression, the Court holds, a government must 
either proscribe all speech or no speech at all.”). 
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significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”239 Thus, 
the Court explained, “A State might choose to prohibit only that 
obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience—i.e., 
that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity.”240 
Yet, one would have thought that St. Paul might have thought these 
fighting words especially important to proscribe, which presumably 
would mean that the announced exception had been met in this case.241 
For purposes here, though, the R.A.V. analysis is noteworthy for a 
few additional reasons. The case involved an attempted cross burning 
in the yard of an African-American family.242 The attempt was made 
sometime between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.243 
The incident was described in the following way: 
Early on June 21, 1990, Russ and Laura Jones, an African-
American couple with five children who had recently moved to a 
predominantly white, working-class neighborhood in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, awoke to the sound of voices in their front yard. 
Looking outside, the Jones family saw in their fenced-in yard a 
small burning cross, a device long associated with the racist 
tactics of the Ku Klux Klan. Fearing for their safety, the family 
called the police.244 
Waking to discover a burning cross in the yard would be terrify–
ing.245 For fighting words analysis, however, there was no hint that any 
member of the family was even tempted to confront these perpetrators 
with violence, so the fighting words exception would not have been 
 
239. Id. at 388 (majority opinion). 
240. Id. 
241. See id. at 407 (White, J., concurring) (“This selective regulation reflects 
the city’s judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other 
fighting words.”). 
242. Id. at 379 (“In the predawn hours of June 21, 1990, petitioner and several 
other teenagers allegedly assembled a crudely made cross by taping together 
broken chair legs. They then allegedly burned the cross inside the fenced 
yard of a black family that lived across the street from the house where 
petitioner was staying.”). 
243. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (Minn. 1991) (“The City of 
St. Paul alleges that between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on June 21, 1990, 
R.A.V. participated in burning a cross inside the fenced yard of an African 
American family’s home.”), rev’d sub nom. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992). 
244. Thomas H. Moore, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: A Curious Way to Protect 
Free Speech, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1252, 1256 (1993) (footnotes omitted). 
245. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 n.1 (noting that there might have been a terror 
prosecution). 
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triggered. Even if the Minnesota Supreme Court was construing the 
ordinance narrowly, there was no likelihood that this particular 
expression would have resulted in the targeted individual responding 
violently, so one would have thought that, following Gooding246 and 
Lewis,247 this conviction could not stand. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court had defined fighting words as “those 
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme–
diate breach of the peace,”248 which the United States Supreme Court 
cited with approval.249 But if the “inflict injury” prong had officially 
been dropped,250 then the Minnesota construction would have been 
overbroad and subject to reversal.251 In his concurrence in the judgment, 
Justice White suggested that the statute was overbroad, not because 
the “inflicts injury” component was included but because the Minnesota 
court had failed to specify which injuries were included and which not.252 
When analyzing fighting words, the Court has included the “inflicts 
injury” prong even after R.A.V.253 The Alvarez Court cited Chaplinsky 
with approval, noting Chaplinsky’s exception from First Amendment 
 
246. See supra notes 176–197 and accompanying text. 
247. See supra notes 200–214 and accompanying text. 
248. In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 510 (emphasis added) (quoting 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
249. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381. 
250. But see Barton, supra note 115, at 1303 (noting that “the Supreme Court 
has never explicitly addressed whether the inflict-injury arm was mere sur–
plusage”). 
251. See supra notes 200–218 and accompanying text (discussing the overbroad 
statutes struck down in Lewis and Hill). 
252. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 413 (White, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (“[T]he 
Minnesota court was far from clear in identifying the ‘injur[ies]’ inflicted by 
the expression that St. Paul sought to regulate.”). 
253. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 
562 U.S. 443, 465 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This Court has recognized 
that words may ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ and that the First 
Amendment does not shield utterances that form ‘no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)). 
Texas v. Johnson and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell provide earlier 
examples. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (“Nor does Johnson’s 
expressive conduct fall within that small class of ‘fighting words’ that are 
‘likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a 
breach of the peace.’ [Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574]. No reasonable onlooker 
would have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction 
with the policies of the Federal Government as a direct personal insult or 
an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.”); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
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protection of “so-called ‘fighting words.’”254 In Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Ass’n, the Court included fighting words within the “well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Consti–
tutional problem.”255 
One would expect that the Court would be very careful when 
describing this “well-defined and narrowly limited class[] of speech.”256 
Regrettably, when analyzing the fighting words category, the Court has 
been inconsistent with respect to what the criteria are and how they 
should be applied.257 The Court sometimes includes an injury compon–
ent in the test but has neither applied it nor limited its application.258 
In most if not all of the cases in which the Court has struck down 
applications of the fighting words test, the Court has interpreted the 
statute under which the individual was convicted to be overbroad 
because of prohibiting too much speech, e.g., speech that invites 
dispute259 or perhaps that is offensive.260 But the statutes having been 
overbroad in any event has meant that there was no need for the Court 
to announce that the “inflicts injury” prong has been excised.261 By the 
 
254. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 
U.S. at 571–72). 
255. 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72); see also 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas. J., concurring) 
(quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72). 
256. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72. 
257.  Compare supra notes 219–225 and accompanying text, with supra notes 
226–233 and accompanying text. 
258.  See supra Part II(B). 
259. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 5 (1948). 
260. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972) (“This definition makes it a 
‘breach of peace’ merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them, and 
so sweeps too broadly.”). 
261. Some of the lower federal courts have noted that the injury prong has been 
included by the Court. See Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1246 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (“Whether words are ‘fighting’ words, that is, words ‘which by 
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of 
the peace,’ . . . depends ‘upon the circumstances of their utterance.’” (first 
citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; and then citing Lewis v. City of New 
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))); Knight Riders 
of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[I]f 
a reasonable onlooker would regard the expressive conduct ‘as a direct 
personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs,’ it is not entitled to 
First Amendment protection.” (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 
(1989))); Sandul v. Larion, 119 F.3d 1250, 1255 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Sandul’s 
words and actions do not rise to the level of fighting words. The actions were 
not likely to inflict injury or to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”); 
McDermott v. Royal, 213 F. App’x 500, 502 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Specifically, 
in City of Houston v. Hill, [482 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1987)], the Supreme Court 
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same token, however, the Court did not need to construe the non-
excised “inflicts injury” component (because the statutes were over–
broad in any case262), so it is unclear whether that prong is still included 
in the fighting words test or how significant an injury must be sustained 
before that part of the fighting words test has been triggered or even 
whether the only kind of injury that would count would be one that 
was so severe as to invite an immediate violent response.263 
The Court has sometimes required that the expression be of the 
kind that would invite an immediate breach of the peace and would in 
fact be likely to bring about a breach of the peace,264 but at other times 
has only required that the speech be of the “correct” sort without 
examining whether in fact violence was likely to occur.265 The Court’s 
approach to the “inflicts injury” prong and to the conditions under 
which the fighting words exception has been met is regrettable, 
especially where the Court has insisted that the relevant statutes not 
be overbroad. If the Court were serious about enforcing the overbreadth 
prohibition and if the “inflicts injury” prong had been removed from 
the test, then one would have expected to Court to strike as overbroad 
any construction incorporating the “inflicts injury” component. The 
Court’s having failed to do so casts doubt on what the proper standard 
is or, perhaps, on the Court’s insistence that statutes not be over–
broad.266 
 
clarified that the First Amendment protects verbal criticism and challenge, 
including profanity, directed to police officers unless the speech consists of 
‘fighting words,’ namely, words that themselves inflict injury or incite 
immediate breach of the peace.”); see also Sambo’s Rests., Inc. v. City of 
Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 697 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J., dissenting) (“The 
Supreme Court has held, however, that some types of speech are not worthy 
of First Amendment protection. ‘Fighting words’ are included in the category 
of unprotected speech. . . . [T]he Supreme Court defined ‘fighting words’ as 
‘those (words) which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite 
an immediate breach of the peace.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)). 
262. See supra notes 192–195 and accompanying text. 
263. See Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Although the 
‘inflict-injury’ alternative in Chaplinsky’s definition of fighting words has 
never been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has never held that the 
government may, consistent with the First Amendment, regulate or punish 
speech that causes emotional injury but does not have a tendency to pro–
voke an immediate breach of the peace.”). 
264. See supra notes 176–214 and accompanying text (discussing Gooding and 
Lewis). 
265. See supra notes 10–74 and accompanying text (discussing Chaplinsky). 
266. See supra notes 104–114 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s 
failure to vacate Feiner’s conviction under an overbroad statute). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020 
Those Are Fighting Words, Aren’t They?  
286 
II. State Applications 
The United States Supreme Court’s contradictory signals about 
fighting words has led the state courts to develop different approaches 
to the kinds of expressions that might be prohibited. The difficulty 
thereby posed is not that state laws differ but that federal constitutional 
guarantees are being interpreted in different ways in different juris–
dictions. Individuals who say the same words in identical contexts are 
subject to prosecution in some states but not in others, even though 
the applicable protections (under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution) should provide the same protection in all of the 
states.  
A. State Courts with More Robust Fighting Words Exceptions 
The state courts have implicitly recognized the United States 
Supreme Court’s ambivalence with respect to which expressions count 
as fighting words and are thus subject to regulation. For example, the 
Court’s continued citation of Chaplinsky without qualification267 sug–
gests that the test offered in Chaplinsky is still good law. Some states 
employ the Chaplinsky approach where it is not necessary to establish 
that an imminent breach of the peace is likely to occur in the very 
circumstances in which the expression is communicated.268 
When discussing why a particular defendant’s language was crimin–
alizable under the fighting words exception, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court noted that “[t]he cumulative force of this evidence leads to the 
conclusion that the defendant’s language could have aroused a violent 
reaction by not only Montigny, but also the crowd.”269 In this case, the 
 
267. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 791 (2011); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003); 
see also Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2312 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second alteration in original) 
(citations omitted from quote) (“In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, for 
example, the Court accepted the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s narrowing 
of a state statute covering ‘any offensive, derisive or annoying word’ to reach 
only those words that would strike the average person as being ‘plainly likely 
to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee[.]’ ‘[T]hus construed,’ this 
Court decided, the statute did not violate the right to free speech.” (citing 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 573 (1942))); Snyder v. 
Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 465 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“This Court has 
recognized that words may ‘by their very utterance inflict injury’ and that 
the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form ‘no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’” (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 57)). 
268. See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
269. State v. Szymkiewicz, 678 A.2d 473, 479 (Conn. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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individuals were physically present where the words were uttered.270 
However, when the defendant was swearing,271 she was in handcuffs and 
being led away by a policemen.272 There was no indication that either 
the police officer or the store detective was even tempted to engage in 
fisticuffs with the defendant.273 By the same token, the Iowa Supreme 
Court construed certain objectionable words as fighting words, even 
though they had been articulated while on the telephone so there was 
no danger of an immediate physical altercation taking place when the 
words were uttered.274 
The Montana Supreme Court criticized the idea that the fighting 
words characterization should depend upon the person at whom they 
were directed.275 The court explained, “Were we to adopt this ‘who is 
likely to respond belligerently’ rationale, any troglodyte could wander 
the streets calling young children and old men ‘f* * * * * * pigs’ because, 
due to their age or infirmity, they, like the well-trained policeman, will 
not be able to respond in a violent fashion.”276 But the question here is 
 
270. Id. at 476. 
271. Id. 
272. See id. at 475. 
273. Id. at 476. 
274. Tim O’Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Iowa 1996) 
(“We think a fact-finder could easily characterize ‘dishonest,’ ‘dead beat,’ and 
‘liar’ as ‘fighting words’ because they attack a person’s integrity. We think 
any reasonable person would conclude that their very utterance would tend 
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. And such conclusion is not 
lessened by the fact that the words were uttered in a telephone conver–
sation.”). But see State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 767 (Mont. 2013) (“We agree 
with the proposition that ‘there is little likelihood of an immediate breach of 
the peace when one can abruptly hang up the receiver.’” (citing Walker v. 
Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975))); State v. Correa, 222 P.3d 1, 8–9 
(N.M. 2009) (“It is also significant that Defendant’s taunting, even though 
his words may have been threatening, occurred at a distance. The amount of 
provocation created by Defendant’s words might have been greater if Defen–
dant were closer to the officers. In this case, Defendant refused to leave his 
porch, indicating that he feared or sought to avoid actual confrontation with 
the officers. Indeed, Officer Townsend testified that the officers were waiting 
for Defendant to come outside so that they could place him under arrest for 
disorderly conduct. If Defendant had advanced beyond his porch or physically 
threatened the officers, they would have seized upon the opportunity to arrest 
him.”). 
275. State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 31 (Mont. 2003) (“[W]e fail to see the logic in 
concluding that words (such as ‘f* * * * * * pig’) may or may not be deemed 
‘fighting words’ depending upon the intended recipient. If the object is a fellow 
citizen, they are considered fighting words. If, on the other hand, the object 
is a police officer, who, if well-trained to exercise restraint, will be less likely 
to respond belligerently, the words are somehow less provocative.”). 
276. Id. The South Dakota Supreme Court has taken the opposite approach. See 
State v. Suhn, 759 N.W.2d 546, 550 (S.D. 2008) (“The circuit court’s findings 
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not whether as a matter of public policy those unwilling to engage in 
fisticuffs should be subject to nasty and insulting comments, but 
whether the First Amendment protects such speech, negative implic–
ations for peaceful people notwithstanding. 
B. State Courts with More Restricted Fighting Words Exceptions 
Other state courts have limited the fighting words exception, 
reading Supreme Court precedent to require a substantial likelihood 
that the imminent breach of the peace will occur in the very circum–
stances in which the expression occurs.277 Expressions that are generally 
understood to qualify as fighting words will nonetheless not provide the 
basis for a disturbing the peace conviction if uttered in a context where 
violence is unlikely to occur. 
The Washington Supreme Court offered a test that is both cate–
gorical and context dependent. The court suggested that for a particular 
expression to count as fighting words “when a civilian is the address–
ee,”278 the following test would be used: “[A]n objective test must be 
applied to evaluate the words spoken. But to pass constitutional 
muster, the court in applying the test must look at the words in the 
actual context or situation in which they were said.”279 
The case involved Camby, a restaurant patron, who had been asked 
to leave the restaurant following other patrons’ complaints.280 Camby 
told the doorman, Gray, that he (Camby) was going to take him (Gray) 
outside and “kick [his] ass.”281 Gray asked a policeman for assistance, 
and the policeman also asked Camby to leave.282 When Camby repeated 
 
do not support a conclusion that Suhn’s words were ‘fighting words.’ The 
circuit court simply relied on its findings that one person might have ‘taken 
offense,’ been sensitive to, or been ‘offended’ by Suhn’s epithet to the police. 
In this context, the circuit court concluded that words constituted ‘fighting 
words,’ unprotected by the First Amendment. We disagree. Just because 
someone may have been offended, annoyed, or even angered by Suhn’s words 
does not make them fighting words. As offensive or abusive as Suhn’s invective 
to the police may have been, ‘when addressed to the ordinary citizen,’ Suhn’s 
words were not ‘inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.’ The circuit court 
erred in determining that Suhn’s utterances were unprotected speech.” (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))). 
277. See e.g., City of Seattle v. Camby, 701 P.2d 499, 501 (Wash. 1985); In re 
Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 451 (Ariz. 2011). 
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his threats to Gray,283 the policeman arrested Camby.284 Both Gray and 
the policemen testified that Gray had not been provoked by Camby 
and that Gray had had no intention of going outside to fight Camby.285 
The Washington court explained that for an expression to count as 
fighting words, “the words must be directed at a particular person or 
group of persons.”286 In addition, the words themselves must be “those 
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary 
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to 
provoke violent reaction.”287 In the court’s view, both of these conditions 
were met.288 The last step involves “look[ing] at the words in the context 
or situation in which they were made.”289 The court explained, “Looking 
at the actual situation presented in this case, we find an intoxicated 
defendant being escorted out of a restaurant by a mild mannered, 
unaroused doorman-host with a police officer present.”290 While “[a] 
civilian addressee need not, in fact, be incited to breach the peace,”291 
more had to be shown to establish that “a substantial risk of assault 
[was] created.”292 The court found “as a matter of law that the words 
spoken in this situation [were] not ‘fighting words’ and that no 
substantial risk of assault was created.”293 
The Arizona Supreme Court endorsed and (allegedly) adopted the 
Washington approach.294 When deciding whether a student who had 
called a teacher a bitch several times295 had expressed speech falling into 
the fighting words exception, the court rejected that the student’s 
“insults would likely have provoked an ordinary teacher to ‘exchange 
 
283. Id. (citation omitted) (“At that point, Camby told Gray to ‘come outside so 
I can kick your fucking ass’. [The policeman] again told Camby to be quiet 
and leave. Camby retorted, ‘I’ll either get him tonight or later.’”). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. at 501 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)). 
287. Id. (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20). 
288. Id. (“Presuming the first two steps are present, which in this case they 
are . . . .”). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 502. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. at 500. 
294. See In re Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 451 (Ariz. 2011) (“Based on the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, we agree with the Washington Supreme Court 
that analyzing whether particular speech constitutes fighting words involves 
a three-step inquiry.” (citing Camby, 701 P.2d at 501)). 
295. See id. at 452. 
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fisticuffs’ with the student or to otherwise react violently.”296 Ironically, 
while attempting to apply the Washington standard, the Arizona court 
instead applied a different standard. The Arizona court realized that 
the relevant “inquiry is not whether a reasonable person ‘might’ react 
violently, but instead whether someone in the circumstances of the 
addressee would likely react violently in the context in which the words 
were spoken.”297 The court then shifted the standard from the reason–
able person to the reasonable teacher—“we do not believe that his 
insults would likely have provoked an ordinary teacher to ‘exchange 
fisticuffs’ with the student or to otherwise react violently.”298 But the 
Washington court had been more focused on the particular victim, 
noting that the “mild mannered, unaroused doorman-host with a police 
officer present”299 did not seem likely to engage in fisticuffs. The 
question was not merely whether a reasonable person in that profession 
would respond violently but whether the person at whom the comments 
were addressed would so respond. Thus, even the courts who realize 
that Supreme Court precedent may limit Chaplinsky cannot agree about 
how that case has been limited.______________________ 
Conclusion 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a fighting words 
exception, which is one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”300 But Court practices 
defy that description, because the category is neither well-defined nor 
narrowly limited. The Court has sent contradictory signals about 
whether it is necessary that the comments are likely to bring about 
violence in the context in which they are uttered. Further, the Court 
has sometimes included an “inflicts injury” prong within the fighting 
words exception and sometimes not. Finally, the Court has not 
adequately explained whether or how offensive insults as opposed to 
offensive ideas fit within the jurisprudence. 
Unsurprisingly, the state interpretations of the jurisprudence vary 
significantly. Some state courts have bridged the gap between words 
 
296. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989)). 
297. Id. 
298. Id.; see also State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 10 (Conn. 2017) (“In sum, these 
cases affirm the fundamental principle that there are no per se fighting words; 
rather, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis all of the circumstances 
relevant to whether a reasonable person in the position of the actual addressee 
would have been likely to respond with violence.”). 
299. Camby, 701 P.2d at 502. 
300. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
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that will injure and words that will cause a breach of the peace by 
suggesting that the words designed to injure will themselves bring about 
an immediate breach of the peace.301 Other courts have not seen a need 
to bridge the gap between inflicting injury and provoking an immediate 
breach of the peace.302 
Some state courts interpret the Federal Constitution to require that 
violence will likely occur in the very circumstances in which the words 
are offered, while other state courts offer a different interpretation.303 In 
short, state courts do not know what the prevailing jurisprudence re–
quires, permits, and prohibits, which means that neither the courts nor 
the legislatures can know the parameters within which they can 
effectuate public policy. 
This lack of clarity has costs. Individuals may be subject to criminal 
prosecution when the First Amendment, properly understood, precludes 
such punishment. Or, individuals may be forced to endure verbal 
assaults which they would not be forced to endure but for a “mistaken” 
interpretation of the First Amendment. In addition, the lack of clarity 
invites inconsistent enforcement of First Amendment guarantees across 
jurisdictions, which itself is problematic. 
At its first opportunity, the Court should clarify the jurisprudence, 
making clear what the First Amendment permits and prohibits. Doing 
 
301. In re S.J.N-K., 647 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (S.D. 2002) (“‘Fighting words,’ as 
defined in Chaplinsky are those words that ‘inflict injury’ or ‘incite an 
immediate breach of peace.’ They have also been defined as ‘[]those personally 
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter 
of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction.’” (first 
quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; and then quoting Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971))); In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (N.C. 1997) (“At 
the hearing on this matter, there was testimony concerning the hurt and anger 
caused African-Americans when they are subjected to racial slurs by white 
people.”); id. at 699 (“[I]n context, his repeated [racial slurs] presents a classic 
case of the use of ‘fighting words’ tending to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace which are not protected by . . . the Constitution.”); City of Billings v. 
Nelson, 322 P.3d 1039, 1045 (Mont. 2014) (alteration in original) (“Nelson 
argues the words ‘spic bastard,’ though ‘harsh, co[a]rse, hurtful, vulgar, 
unpleasant, distasteful, or rude,’ are not fighting words. She also argues she 
was not face-to-face with M.C. because she remained inside her vehicle. The 
use of a racial slur is the type of speech that would, by its very utterance, 
inflict injury and tend to incite a breach of the peace.” (citing State v. Dugan, 
303 P.3d 755, 761 (Mont. 2013))). 
302. See, e.g., State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 521 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“Acts 
that cause immediate substantial fright, intimidation, or emotional distress 
are the sort of acts that inherently tend to inflict injury or provoke violence.”). 
303. See supra Part III. 
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so would promote uniformity of application304 and would promote con–
fidence that rules are being applied consistently rather than to serve 
other purposes.305 The failure to clarify an allegedly well-defined and 
narrow category undermines confidence in the First Amendment and in 
the Court, a result that no one should desire. ______________  
 
 
304. See Note, supra note 3, at 1144 (“A statute that mimics the ‘breach of the 
peace’ prong of Chaplinsky confers significant discretion upon an enforcing 
officer and thus invites abuse.”). 
305. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 415–16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (“I fear that the Court has been distracted from its proper 
mission by the temptation to decide the issue over ‘politically correct speech’ 
and ‘cultural diversity,’ neither of which is presented here.”). 
 
